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Causal Context Presented in
Subsequent Event Modifies the
Perceived Timing of Cause and Effect
Hiroyuki Umemura*
Human Informatics Research Institute, National Institute of Advanced Industrial Science and Technology, Tsukuba, Japan
The effect of perceived causality on other aspects of perception, such as temporal
or spatial perception, has interested many researchers. Previous studies have shown
that the perceived timing of two events is modulated when the events are intentionally
produced or the causal link between the two events was known in advance. However,
little research has directly supported the idea that causality alone can modulate the
perceived timing of two events without having knowledge about causal links in advance.
In this study, I used novel causal displays in which various types of causal contexts could
be presented in subsequent events (movement or color change of objects). In these
displays, the preceding events were the same (ball falling from above), so observers
could not predict which subsequent events displayed. The results showed that the
perceived causal context modulated the temporal relationship of two serial events so
as to be consistent with the causal order implied by the subsequent event; ball hit the
floor, then objects moved. These modulations were smaller when the movements implied
preceding effect of the falling ball (e.g., wind pressure). These results are well-suited
to the Bayesian framework in which the perceived timing of events is reconstructed
through the observers’ prior experiences, and suggest that multiple prior experiences
would competitively contribute to the estimation of the timing of events.
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INTRODUCTION
When one sees a ball flying toward a glass and breaking it, one also perceives causality between these
two events, namely the ball hit and broke the glass. The perception of causality has been attracted
many researchers since Michotte showed that simple visual stimuli could give the impression
of a causal connection between events (Michotte, 1963; Wagemans et al., 2006). It is relatively
recent that studies about the effects of causal perception on other perceptual process such as
temporal (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; Haggard et al., 2002; Buehner, 2012; Bechlivanidis and
Lagnado, 2013) and/or spatial perception (Scholl and Nakayama, 2004; Buehner and Humphreys,
2010) have appeared. However, such studies have obtained various interesting findings. One type
of experimental evidence for the effect of causality on temporal perception was introduced by
Haggard (Haggard et al., 2002), who showed that the perceived timing of two causally linked
events converged together such that participants perceived voluntary movements (key-press) as
occurring later and their sensory consequences (tone) as occurring earlier than they actually
did. Although they offered an explanation in which the binding effect is rooted in the motor
system and is driven by the intentional action planning for this “intentional binding” phenomenon
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(Haggard et al., 2002; Haggard, 2005; Engbert and Wohlschläger,
2007; Moore and Haggard, 2008), several researchers proposed
that causality should be the root of this temporal attraction, and
that the intentional binding should be a subset of a more general
“causal” binding (Eagleman and Holcombe, 2002; Buehner,
2012). Buehner (2012) demonstrated that both a self-causal
condition, in which participants themselves pressed a button, and
a machine-causal condition, in which a machine pressed a button
instead of a participant, produced more temporal binding than a
non-causal condition did. This indicates that temporal binding
occurs without one’s intention. Further, he discussed that the
prediction of future events that is driven by the causal knowledge
should contribute to these results.
If causality, however, is the root for attracting the timing
of two events, it can also be predicted that temporal attraction
should be observed even when the prediction is not available.
The notion of causal binding has its basis on Bayesian inference,
which enables us to model the uncertainty about the world by
combining prior probabilities with sensory evidence to infer
the most probable interpretation of the environment (Knill and
Richards, 1996). The brain uses prior knowledge that events
known to be causally related are more likely to occur closer
in time than unrelated events are to resolve the ambiguity in
time perception. This shifts the estimates of “cause” and “effect”
toward one another. The Bayesian model has explained a variety
of phenomena in vision (Yuille and Bülthoff, 1996; Weiss et al.,
2002; Welchman et al., 2008), sensory motor control (Körding
and Wolpert, 2004, 2006), multimodal integration (Ernst and
Banks, 2002; Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004) and temporal perception
(Miyazaki et al., 2005). In the Bayesian framework, prediction of
the future that is driven by causal knowledge can be formulated as
the selection of a prior probability according to a certain context.
However, in this framework, an appropriate prior probability can
be selected even after an observation. This means that we can
expect the situation in which temporal modulation is observed
for stimuli in which the causal context is not given in advance.
Several previous studies on causality perception have
employed Michotte’s launching display in which one object
moves toward another stationary object until they are adjacent,
then the moving object stops and the stationary one starts
moving along the same path, and in a typical case, a we
perceive collision in the display (Michotte, 1963; Scholl and
Nakayama, 2002; Choi and Scholl, 2006). Some researchers
proposed more informative causal displays such as “pulling” or
“enforce disintegration” (White and Milne, 1997, 1999; Scholl
and Tremoulet, 2000). To my knowledge, a recent study by
Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016) is the only one which showed
that causal contexts could modulate the temporal relationship
of two events without advanced information. They too used
Michotte-like stimuli. Their stimuli had an additional object
between the two objects. Specifically, the leftmost object moved
toward the middle one, with the collision of the leftmost object
with the middle object, the rightmost object started moving,
and the middle object started moving after a 350 ms delay.
Participants perceived the start of the middle object before the
start of rightmost object despite the delay, indicating that the
perceived order was reordered based on the causal order.
The stimuli in the present study were devised based on
these displays. However, there were several differences between
previous stimuli and the present stimuli. One of notable
differences is that various and informative causal contexts
were represented by objects’ movements or feature changes in
subsequent events. I thought that stimulus change in subsequent
event might be able to retrospectively imply a context of causal
links. For example, if participants perceive that objects were
moved as if they were blown by the wind pressure of a preceding
object, this suggests that they would perceive that objects started
moving before the contact of the preceding object. For the
purpose, I created several types of movement which would
give different interpretations. Therefore, the information in the
stimuli was increased by simulating a scene in a 3-dimensional
view and by simulating the motion by multiple objects. Using
these stimuli, I demonstrated that these different contexts have
different effects on temporal perception, even though this did
not allow observers to predict the causal context in advance.
Moreover, in the experiments by Bechlivanidis and Lagnado
(2016), each participant experienced the causal display only a
few times, such that it was unclear whether the causal context
is effective even after the participants repeatedly observed the
causal displays. In the present study, participants repeatedly
observed causal displays, whichwould reveal whether the effect of
causal contexts on the temporal perception were rigid or not, and
it made it possible to quantitatively estimate shifts of perceived
timings of the contact.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
In this study, using computer generated animation, the falling of
a ball was utilized as the preceding event. In subsequent events,
10 rings on the floor moved or changed their color. I prepared
four types of displays (see Figure 1, and Videos S1–S8 in the
Supplementary file). For type A, B, and C stimuli, the preceding
event was a ball falling from above and the subsequent event
was the movement of 10 rings on the floor. Three types of ring
movements could be interpreted as different causal contexts. For
type D stimuli, a ball fell and the rings changed their color. The
timing of the end of the first event to the start of the second event
was chosen from nine inter-stimulus interval (ISI) conditions.
Participants were required to judge whether the end of the first
event or the start of the second event occurred first (temporal
order judgement task).
Participants
Twenty-seven observers (aged 20–37 years), naïve to the
experimental purpose, participated in the present study. All the
experimental procedures were approved by the Ethics Committee
for Human and Animal Research of the National Institute of
Advanced Industrial Science and Technology (AIST). All subjects
provided written informed consent in accordance with the
Declaration of Helsinki before the experiment. Based on prior
literature and my other works, it was decided ahead of time to
select a minimum of 25 participants for the experiment. Thirty
participants were recruited and three participants canceled. All
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FIGURE 1 | Stimulus design and procedure of the temporal order judgement task. The preceding event was a ball falling from above for all types of stimuli.
The objects (rings) positioned on a floor started to move or change their color around the time when the falling ball contacted the floor. Four types of stimuli were
prepared. (A) Rings started short rapid movements in random directions for a short time; (B) rings rapidly moved toward the outer edge in random directions and
distances; (C) rings moved with a straight and smooth motion toward the outer edge; and (D) rings changed in color. The two events occurred serially with controlled
inter-stimulus intervals (ISI). A negative ISI indicates that the second event started before the ball contacted the floor.
data collection was completed before commencing the statistical
analyses.
Apparatus and Setup
The experiments were conducted in a dimly lit room. A
Windows PC was used to control the stimulus presentation on
a CRT monitor (Sony 24′′ GDMFW900) placed 40 cm from the
observer. The height of the center of the display and the eye-
height of each participant was adjusted using a chin-rest. The
CRT’s refresh rate was 85 Hz and resolution was 1,024 × 768.
10 keys were used for making responses.
Stimuli and Tasks
The visual stimuli were sequences of animation which consisted
of two serial events: The fall of a ball from above and the
movements of 10 objects placed on the floor. The scene in the
animation was three-dimensionally rendered and the viewpoint
was placed at 45◦ elevated from the horizontal floor. The falling
ball was a shaded green sphere subtending 1◦ in diameter. The
10 objects were shaded red rings, each subtending 1◦ in diameter.
The 10 rings were placed along a circle whose width was 4◦. The
preceding event was the same for all the stimuli; the ball fell from
12◦ above from the center of the rings (=fixation) and stopped
when the ball touched the floor at the center of the rings. The ball
traveled this distance in 142 ms. Four types of subsequent events
were prepared. For the Type A stimulus (Videos 1, 2), the rings
started short rapid movements for random distances (about −1
to 1◦ in visual angle) for a short time (about 35 ms) and then
the magnitude of the movements rapidly decreased and the rings
continued to tremble. For the Type B stimulus (Videos 3, 4), the
rings started rapid movement toward the outer edge with slight
randomness in directions. They rapidly moved at a visual angle
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of about 5◦, nearly 70 ms later, and then the magnitude of the
movements rapidly decreased and the rings continued to tremble.
In Type C (Videos 5, 6), the rings moved with a straight and
smooth motion toward the outer edge. They moved by about 5◦
in visual angle, nearly 70 ms later, and then continued spreading.
For the Type D stimulus (Videos 7, 8), the rings changed their
color from red to yellow. In each trial, the static rings on the
ground were initially displayed. Then, the ball fell down and the
rings started moving or changed color, with various delays. The
movement was generated in each of trials. The ISIs were chosen
from −118, −94, −71, −47, −24 0, 24, 47, and 71 ms, where
negative ISIs indicate that a subsequent event started before the
ball contacted the floor. In the supplementary files, Videos 1, 3,
5, and 7 are picked up from stimuli with ISI = 0 ms, and Videos
2, 4, 6, and 8 are ISI = −71 ms. The image quality was slightly
degraded in these supplementary videos as compared to those
in the original displays because of video conversion, and their
temporal resolution was lessened from 85 to 60 fps.
Procedure
Temporal Order Judgement Task
Participants judged the temporal order of the ball contacting the
floor (stopping) and the start of the rings’ movements using a
two-alternative forced-choice design. Participants pressed the “4”
key when they perceived the rings starting movements before
the ball contacted the floor, or pressed the “6” key when they
perceived the rings starting movements after the ball contacted
the floor. Participants conducted several practice trials which
included all of the four types of events. In the experiment, the four
types of stimuli with nine ISIs were displayed in random order.
Participants were shown all combinations of stimuli type and ISIs
(4× 9) nine times in random order, such that they conducted 324
trials. These trials were divided into three blocks. No feedback
was provided during the task.
Causal Judgement Task
The causal judgement task was conducted after all the temporal
order judgement tasks were completed. In this task and in the
subsequent interview, animations with an ISI of −118, 0, or
71 ms were displayed for participants. Participants choose a
higher score (max 9) when they strongly perceived causality
(instruction: “If you experience that the falling ball caused
the rings’ movement or color change, please give a high
rating. However, if you feel there was no causality between the
movement or the color change of the rings and the falling ball,
please give the lowest score of 0. You can choose one of ten scores
for your judgements. If you experience a slight strangeness, please
decrease the scores in a descending order from 9. If you do not
experience causality but think that a less causal stimulus would
exist, please increase the score in an ascending order from 0. You
need not be concerned how the falling ball caused the movement
or color change. I will ask for your interpretation about perceived
causality later. As far as possible, you should recall the perceived
causalities during the temporal order judgement tasks conducted
before and rate the causality based on them.”). All the animations
were rated twice or once (for the first five participants), in
random order, such that the number of trials were 18 or 9.
Interview
An interview was conducted after the causal judgement task.
The same animations that were used in the causal judgement
task (ISI of −118, 0, or 71 ms) were used for the interview. An
experimenter sat next to a participant, showed the participant one
of the animations, and asked him/her to express how the falling
ball caused the second event when they perceived causality.
Participants could freely express the causality they experienced.
When the participants did not experience causality, they could
simply report that they did not experience causality. After the
participant expressed their perceptions of causality for all the
animations, the experimenter asked the participants to confirm
the following point if they did not report that the rings were
moved by wind pressure or repulsing forces from the falling ball
in the ISI=−118 ms sessions of Type A, B, or C stimuli: “Didn’t
you perceive such a force or pressure during the temporal order
judgement tasks?” The order of presentation about the stimulus
type was randomized but the order of ISIs was ascending order
from ISI = −118. Participants were instructed about which type
of animations would be shown to them next, and could ask the
experimenter to repeatedly show a stimulus.
RESULTS
Temporal Order Judgement Task
Figure 2 shows results of the temporal order judgement
experiment in which participants were required to answer
whether the rings started moving before the falling ball contacted
the surface, or the rings started moving after the ball made
contact. The proportions of trials in which the end of the
preceding event was earlier than the start of the subsequent
event were plotted and the point of subjective equality (PSE),
which indicates that the end of the first event and the start of
the second event were simultaneous, was calculated by fitting
with a cumulative Gaussian function as an index of the extent
to which the timing of the end of the first event and the start of
the second event converged (Figure 2A). PSEs were calculated
for each participant. Their averages and SDs for each stimulus
type were as follows: A:−78.8 (SD= 41.2), B:−48.7 (SD= 37.6),
C: −45.3 (SD = 34.0), and D: −9.5 (SD = 22.4). They are
presented in Figure 2B. The PSEs were analyzed with repeated
measures ANOVA with one factor (stimulus type). The repeated
measures ANOVA revealed a significant main effect of stimulus
type [F(3, 78) = 25.414, p <.001, η
2
= 0.494]. A post-hoc
comparison with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed a significant
difference between the D and A, B, or C stimuli (p < 0.001, for all
pairs), and revealed significant differences between A and either
B or C (p= 0.007, p= 0.001, respectively), but not between B and
C (p > 0.5).
Causality Rating Task and Interviews
Table 1 shows the summary of these causality ratings. Although
results for the 71 ms condition were displayed in Table 1,
they were not analyzed here, because they should have little
contribution to the present study. One-way ANOVA for rated
causality with ISI = 0 ms showed a significant effect of stimulus
type [F(3, 78) = 17.049, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.396], and a post-hoc
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FIGURE 2 | Results of the temporal order judgements task. (A) The
average proportion of trials in which participants reported that the end of the
first event (ball contacting) was earlier than the start of the second event is
plotted against the ISI. The curves in this figure are fit for the mean proportions
over all the participants. (B) Averaged PSE shift from zero for all participants.
Error bars indicate 95% CI. **Indicates p < 0.01.
comparison with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed significant
differences between D and A, B, or C stimuli (p = 0.007,
p = 0.001, p < 0.001, respectively), and between A and C
(p = 0.004). The ANOVA for the rated causality for ISI=-118
ms among stimulus types A, B, or C showed a significant effect
of stimulus-type [F(3, 78) = 7.906, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.233], and
a post-hoc comparison with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed
significant differences between A and B (p = 0.049), A and C
(p = 0.026), B and D (p = 0.005), and C and D (p = 0.008), but
not between B and C (p > 0.5), and A and D (p > 0.5).
The interpretations of the participants were categorized into
the expressions shown in Table 2. Results for 71 ms were not
displayed because of space limitations. No participants reported
multiple interpretations for a stimulus. For Type A, B, and C
stimuli in the ISI = 0 ms condition, most participants answered
TABLE 1 | Mean rated causalities in the causality rating task.
Stimulus type M (SD) 95% CI
ISI = 71
Type A 5.4 (2.2) [4.4, 6.2]
Type B 6.0 (2.0) [5.2, 6.8]
Type C 6.0 (2.5) [5.0, 7.0]
Type D 5.1 (2.2) [4.2, 5.9]
ISI = 0
Type A 7.1 (1.7) [6.4, 7.8]
Type B 7.4 (1.7) [6.7, 8.1]
Type C 8.1 (1.2) [7.5, 8.6]
Type D 5.0 (2.3) [4.1, 6.0]
ISI = −118
Type A 3.3 (2.5) [2.3, 4.2]
Type B 4.6 (2.9) [3.4, 5.8]
Type C 4.5 (2.3) [3.6, 5.4]
Type D 2.6 (2.5) [1.6, 3.6]
that it looked as if the rings were moved by the impact of the
ball contacting the surface; some perceived animacy, such as the
rings running away from the ball. For Type D stimuli, most
participants perceived that the ball tripped a switch on the floor
to change the color of the rings, but the rated causality was
relatively small compared to that for type A, B, and C stimuli.
Some participants reported the effect of the falling ball before
the ball contacted the surface (ISI = −118 ms) for Type B
and C with these interpretations; it looked as if the rings were
blown by the wind pressure caused by the falling ball, or the
rings were burst by magnetic repulsion. Similar answers were
obtained for Type A stimuli but the number was small. The
numbers of participants who mentioned these preceding and
subsequent effects are shown in Table 2. Although there were a
small number of unpredicted observations, these answers were
generally consistent with the intention of the experimenter in
creating these movements.
Discussion
These analyses revealed negative shifts of PSE in Type A, B,
and C stimuli as compared to that in Type D. This indicates
that participants’ perceived temporal orders changed according
to the causal order; a ball hit the ground and then rings moved.
Additionally, the results of the analysis showed interesting results
between the PSEs of A and B or C; the shift in the PSE in
Type A was significantly smaller than that in others. These
three types of stimuli had similar rated causality and received
similar interpretations when ISI = 0 ms (i.e., no delay). These
differences are thought to be caused by contexts from a falling
ball before contacting the surface, which were described as “wind
pressure” or “magnetic repulsion.” These were more frequently
reported for Type B and C stimuli than for Type A stimuli when
ISI = −181 ms. Here, we can hypothesize that these preceding
effects would conflict with the effect of causality occurring at
the time of impact of the ball. Thus, this preceding effect
would weaken the effect of subsequent causality, because these
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TABLE 2 | Reported interpretations and numbers of participants who
stated the interpretations.
Stimulus type Interpretation n Total
ISI = 0
Type A Trembled by collision impact 21
Run away from or avoid a ball 3
Others 2
26
Type B Scattered by collision impact 21
Run away from or avoid a ball 4
Other 1
26
Type C Spread by collision impact 26
Other 1
27













Type C Wind pressure 5
Magnetic repulsion 2
Run away from or avoid a ball 2
Experienced causality but could not express 3
12
Type D There is a (transparent) switch above the floor 3
3
preceding effects would be able to move the rings before the ball
contacted the surface.
One type of evidence for this hypothesis was the significantly
smaller rated causality for Type A stimuli in the preceding
condition (ISI = −118 ms). Here, it is also expected that
there would be a correlation between these causality rating for
ISI = −181 ms and the shift of PSE in each participant. To
examine this, I used the rating and PSE of Type C as a baseline,
and calculated the difference between the baseline and those of
Type A and B for each participant (Figure 3). These differences
in the PSE and ratings showed a significant correlation (n = 54,
r = 0.47, p < 0.001), which also suggests that the weaker
perceived preceding causality in Type A might shift the PSE
toward a negative value. However, when the ratings and PSEs
FIGURE 3 | Correlation scatter plot for causality ratings for ISI = −181
and shifts of PSE in each participant. Differences between the causality
ratings between A or B and C (A–C and B–C) are plotted against the
differences between the shifts of PSE in A or B and C (A–C and B–C). The
Pearson correlation coefficient between the two variables was 0.471
(p < 0.01).
for Type D were used as a baseline, the correlation was relatively
small (n = 81, r = 0.28, p = 0.01). This might be because the
difference of the criteria used to evaluate causality for Type D and
for other three types varied more largely among participants. We
should therefore be cautious while comparing causality ratings
among different situations.
I conducted another comparison to confirm this hypothesis.
I created a subgroup which consisted of 10 participants who did
not report the preceding effect of the falling ball for any type of
stimuli. If the preceding causality affected the shift of the PSE,
it would be expected that this subgroup would show smaller or
no differences between Type A and B or C stimuli. Although
this comparison is not sufficient evidence for the difference
between A and B or C, it would be necessary to examine whether
the difference arose from a preceding effect of causality. In the
subgrouping, 10 participants who did not report the preceding
effect of the falling ball for any type of stimuli even after the
interpretation was suggested by the experimenter were chosen.
They were compared with the rest of the participants (n = 15).
Two participants, who were aware of the interpretation after the
experimenter’s suggestion were removed from both groups.
The averaged PSE shift for each subgroup are shown in
Figure 4. Their averages and SDs for each stimulus type in the
participants who reported the preceding causality were A: −55.3
(SD = 41.2), B: −43.5 (SD = 29.6), C: −31.7 (SD = 27.5),
and D: −12.9 (SD = 25.3), and averages and SDs for the rest
were A: −95.3 (SD = 41.9), B: −58.8 (SD = 39.0), C: −57.6
(SD = 46.0), and D: −7.0 (SD = 25.1). A repeated measures
ANOVA with one-within and one-between factors (stimulus-
type and group) revealed the significant effect of the stimulus
type [F(3, 69) = 21.649, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.485], the group
[F(1, 23) = 74.689, p < 0.001, η
2
= 0.765], and their significant
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FIGURE 4 | Results of the temporal order judgement with subgrouping.
Averaged PSEs for the subgroup which consisted of participants who were not
aware of the preceding effect of the falling ball (n = 10) and for the rest of the
participants (n = 15). Two participants who were aware of the interpretation
after the experimenter’s suggestion were removed from both the groups. Error
bars indicate 95% CI. **Indicates p < 0.01 and *indicates p < 0.05.
interaction [F(3, 69) = 2.829, p = 0.045, η
2
= 0.11]. Post-
hoc comparisons with a Bonferroni adjustment revealed no
significant differences between each pair of A, B, and C (all
p > 0.5) in the subgroup of participants who did not report
causality. There was a significant difference between A and
D in the subgroup (p > 0.05). In contrast, the results of
the comparisons for the rest of the participants were similar
to those in the comparison for all participants (see Figure 4
for these results). Comparisons of the PSE for each type of
stimulus between the subgroup of participants who did not report
causality and the rest showed a significant difference only in
the Type A stimulus (p = 0.018). These results supported the
hypothesis that preceding effects would conflict with the effect
of causality occurring at the time of impact of the ball. It should
be noted that, if the preceding effect alone was decreased in
this subgroup, we should expect a larger effect of subsequent
causal contexts in the subgroup; i.e., the PSEs of Type B and
C would shift toward a negative value. However, the PSEs of
Type A largely shifted toward a positive value, and the PSE
of Type B and C also shifted toward positive value in this
subgroup. I speculate that this should indicate that the effects of
subsequent events were also weak for these participants who were
not report the preceding causality, and that they were generally
unsusceptible to the effects of causality. The causality ratings
were as follows: A: 2.8, B: 4.15, C: 3.25, and D: 1.45, for each
type of stimulus in the subgroup of participants who were not
aware the preceding causality, and A: 3.9, B: 5.9, C: 5.33, and
D: 3.9 for the rest of the participants. These relatively low mean
causality rating scores even for Type B and C stimuli in the
subgroup might indicate that participants who did not report the
preceding causality were generally unsusceptible to the effects of
causality.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present study showed that the perception of causality leads
to the reconstruction of the temporal order of serial events
consistent with the causal context; that is, a cause precedes
its effect. These results are generally accorded the report by
Bechlivanidis and Lagnado (2016). Previous studies (Eagleman
and Holcombe, 2002; Shimojo, 2014) suggested that the brain
should reorganize the event sequence in accordance with a
contextual or causal framework if two events have sufficient
causal links. In the present experiment, the stimuli representing
the causality by object movement could offer sufficient causal
links without the contribution of prediction or intention. On the
other hand, the stimulus with color change could not modulate
the temporal relationship, even though most of participants
could state the interpretation about the perceived causal
link.
Because the causal contexts were given in subsequent events,
their effect should be formed by integrating information
presented within a short temporal window, i.e., retrospectively.
Such retrospective effects relating causality perception have been
reported in several studies (Choi and Scholl, 2006; Buehner
and Humphreys, 2010; Kim et al., 2013). For example, Choi
and Scholl (2006) demonstrated that the contextual impact
yields a perceived collision in the full-overlap event even after
the moment of full overlap has already passed. The findings
from these studies and from the present study suggest that
our perception is not a conservative interpretation of sequential
input, but it is a dynamic reconstruction process in which
new information modifies the immediate past. The present
study should add a new insight that the causal context implied
in a subsequent event affects this dynamic reconstruction
process.
The novel finding in the present study is that the multiple
contexts should competitively affect the reconstruction of the
temporal structure. The falling ball could affect objects before
contacting the floor through causal links interpreted as “magnetic
repulsion” or “wind pressure” if subsequent events could fit the
interpretations. This view is supported by correlation between
PSE shifts and causality rating, and the results where the
participants who were not aware of the interpretation about
the preceding effect of the falling ball were not affected by the
preceding causal context.
The current findings fit well with the Bayesian framework
if one assumes the temporal order of events was reconstructed
among certain temporal windows (i.e., not too much time
lapse). As described earlier, Bayesian inference enables us
to model uncertainty about the world by combining prior
probabilities with observational, sensory evidence to infer
the most probable interpretation of the environment. In the
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present case, priors would be a complex distribution combining
distributions concerning the context of the preceding effect
(e.g., magnetic force) and subsequent effects (e.g., impact force),
and would competitively interact (Jepson et al., 1996; Yuille
and Bülthoff, 1996; Wu et al., 2009). A feature (i.e., type of
movement) contained in the subsequent event would activate
particular priors to reconstruct a temporal structure. The Type
A movement would not activate the priors which consist of
preceding causality, or would activate the priors with a small
probability, because this type of movement does not fit to any
of preceding effects. While for the Type B or C movements, the
priors concerning preceding causality have a greater probability,
and the mixture of priors concerning each of the preceding and
subsequent causalities are competitively activated. Consequently,
the shifting of the PSE became relatively small compared to
that observed with reference to Type A stimuli. In contrast,
Type D stimuli did not affect perceived timing. This would be
because knowledge about the causal link between ball contact
and color change would be less rigid, and the distribution
of duration between two events is more broad (i.e., it is
frequent that there is a delay between switch and light, and
the lengths of the delay are not constant) than those of ball
movements.
In the analysis, I showed that participants who could not
report about the preceding effect were not only affected by the
preceding context, but they were also less affected by subsequent
contexts. These observers would be formulated as observers
who are relying more on observation (likelihood) than on prior
probabilities in the Bayesian framework. For such observers,
prior probabilities concerning the preceding context became
relatively small and, in such a case, the context would not
be activated. Thus, the context did not affect the temporal
perception and the corresponding causal context might therefore
not be perceived.
Although I stressed that prediction is not necessary to observe
a temporal modulation (causal binding), this does not mean
that I intend to exclude the contribution of prediction from
the causal binding. As expressed in the Introduction section,
the role of prediction also can be formulated in the Bayesian
framework. Whichever causal contexts are given in advance
or are given in the stimulus, they are used by the brain
to decrease the ambiguity in observation, and, consequently,
temporal perception is modulated so as to accord with the
causal context. In this framework, intention could be thought
of as one example of predictive causal links (Buehner, 2012).
Interestingly, the present study predicts that there might be a
case in which causality prolongs a temporal interval of two
events if a causal context is appropriately provided. In further
study, investigations to reveal how causal contexts given in a
predictive and retrospective manner interact with each other, or
demonstrations which show prolongation of temporal intervals
of two events are expected.
In this framework, not only perceived temporal order but also
the causal structure itself automatically should be determined
from the combination of priors and observational input. This
view corresponds to the supposition that the causal structure of
the world can be directly perceived (Michotte, 1963; Schlottmann
and Shanks, 1992; Rolfs et al., 2013). In other words, the detection
of causality should be processed in an earlier stage, though
the causality has been thought of as higher-level properties.
Here, I speculate that linguistic expressions about causal contexts
might involve a different process from the detection of causality,
and be processed after the perception of causal structures.
On this point, previous research indicated that the causal
perception and causal inference should be dissociating processes
(Schlottmann and Shanks, 1992; Roser et al., 2005). These
different processing strategies should lead to various types of
introspections in the interviews, and might sometimes lead to
a discrepancy between perception and expression. Therefore, I
do not think that participants who did not report the preceding
effect and participants who were unsusceptible to the preceding
effect completely correspond, but they should be correlated.
Future study using another subgrouping, such as that based on
brain activity, would be expected to divide the participants to
allow for the investigation of individual differences in causality
perception.
There remains a question of why it had been difficult to
observe temporal modulation related to causality with the classic
ball-collision stimulus or some other stimuli until Bechlivanidis
and Lagnado (2016) and this study examined them. Here,
we can identify several differences between previous stimuli
and the current stimuli: Contribution of gravity, nature of
the animation, three-dimensional setting, and the existence of
the floor. Here, I will particularly discuss the existence of the
floor, which could be a conductor for the energy of the ball’s
collision in some displays. This setting prevented participants
from observing the direct collision of the ball and objects; the
observation of direct collision should increase the reliability of
the sensory evidence in a Bayesian formulation. It is known
that ambiguity of sensory evidence increases the contribution
of prior knowledge. Reconstructed temporal structures could be
separated from structures supported by sensory input. This is
also the case in the stimuli used in Bechlivanidis and Lagnado’s
(2016) study; there was an object which can be considered to
mediate the energy, and there was a gap between this object
(cause) and rightmost object (effect). In their study, there was
350 ms delay between the start of the rightmost object and that
of the middle object in their stimulus, which is larger than the
temporal shifts obtained in the present study. One reason for
the discrepancy might result from the difference in the number
of trials conducted by each participant. In Bechlivanidis and
Lagnado’s (2016) study, the experiment was conducted using a
between-subjects design, and the participants observed the causal
display only a few times. On the other hand, participants in the
present study repeatedly observed causal displays, which might
have increased their sensitivity to the temporal structure of the
stimuli and increased their accuracy in the task.
Taken as whole, the present study demonstrated that the
perceived temporal orders of the cause and effect were transposed
according to the perceived causality. Moreover, the results
of experiments indicated the competitive effects of multiple
causalities on temporal perception, and these results are well-
suited to the explanation based on the Bayesian estimation.
However, there remain many questions about how and where
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causality (and its mediating force) are represented and processed
in the brain, or what kinds of causal contexts are stored and used
by the brain. It is expected that the stimuli introduced in the
present study would be helpful for future studies to explore these
questions.
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